The president of the United States, through the Department of Defense, is required by law to review the status of nuclear policy and the apparatus to support it. New presidents want to put their stamp on nuclear strategy, so they usually commission a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) early in their term.
The 2018 NPR, which was released on 2 February, draws stark contrasts between the policies of President Trump and those of his predecessor. The biggest difference is in tone: Whereas President Obama’s 2010 review leaned toward eliminating nuclear weapons and limiting the growth of stockpiles, the new NPR increases the role of nuclear weapons in warfare and argues that more types are needed. It moves toward a resumption of nuclear testing for new weapons and downplays the role of nonproliferation and arms control.
The new NPR urges continuing the modernization of the strategic nuclear force that was in progress under Obama, which includes improvements to nuclear weapons as well as the missiles, planes, and submarines that carry them. The document also calls for two new types of nuclear arms: low-yield weapons (about the size of the Hiroshima bomb) for submarines and a submarine-launched cruise missile. The total deployed nuclear arsenal must remain under the limit of 1550 imposed by New START; the NPR says the US will continue to comply with the 2011 treaty.
Changes in nuclear weapons policy have to be made slowly because our policy is intertwined with those of other countries, including the allies who depend on the US for protection. In addition, the nuclear production complex can handle only so many projects at one time. Nuclear weapons are physical things that must be designed, fabricated, assembled, and moved around. That requires people, buildings, and machinery, all of which are specialized and expensive. Current facilities need upgrades, and their capacity is limited. Although the rationale provided for commissioning new nuclear weapons is to meet national security challenges that exist today, those weapons will not be ready for a decade or more. In view of that time line, the US government should more strongly consider diplomacy as a solution to the problems that the new weapons ostensibly address.
As the NPR notes, “Over half of [the National Nuclear Security Administration’s] infrastructure is over 40 years old, and a quarter dates back to the Manhattan Project era.” The nuclear production complex has undergone little modernization since it was built in the 1940s and 1950s. Some elements, like the plutonium production reactors at Hanford, Washington, and Savannah River, South Carolina, are no longer needed and are being disassembled. Other parts, like gaseous diffusion facilities for enriching uranium, have been removed even though their functions are still needed.
What’s left behind is a limited infrastructure for the nuclear weapons program. In the US, the only facility that can produce plutonium pits, the nuclear explosive part of bombs, is at Los Alamos, New Mexico. The TA-55 Plutonium Facility (PF-4) was built in 1978 and has been upgraded to allow production of up to 80 pits a year. That number has never been demonstrated, however, and no pits have been produced since 2011. The NPR requires such demonstration by 2030. Los Alamos has had a number of safety infractions at PF-4, leading to shutdowns for significant periods of time. Los Alamos is now undergoing a change in its management contract. Bids have been submitted, and the winner is scheduled to be announced in April.
The single plant that assembles complete nuclear weapons and disassembles them is Pantex, in Amarillo, Texas. Pantex operates at capacity now, upgrading four types of nuclear weapons as part of the modernization program and disassembling weapons taken out of service. The 2018 NPR expands Pantex’s responsibilities to include modifications of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and assembly of a new cruise missile.
The Savannah River site has made overtures to supplement Los Alamos for pit production, but that would require a new complex of buildings. The site’s partially built and wildly over-budget and behind-schedule plant for converting weapons-grade plutonium to mixed oxide reactor fuel might serve as a basis. Still, such a project could take another decade or two and billions of dollars to complete.
The US has little or no capacity to produce other necessary weapons components. The country does not produce the isotopically specialized lithium needed for thermonuclear weapons; it is recovered from surplus warheads. Tritium is currently produced in civilian reactors, but that treads a thin legal line and may not be possible when fuel for those reactors is acquired from foreign sources. The US has the opposite problem with plutonium: Because of arms control agreements there is a surplus, but the government hasn’t decided what to do with it.
Considering all the holes and inefficiencies in the nuclear weapons complex, it’s no surprise the requests in the NPR will not come cheap. Before the document was released, former National Nuclear Security Administration head Frank Klotz estimated that $3 billion is needed just for deferred maintenance. The NPR offers no specifics as to requested budget amounts or which improvements should be made.
Timing is a concern too. The first part of the 2018 NPR argues that the US must match Russia’s current nuclear capabilities and ongoing modernization. But the document authors admit that much of what they propose will not be available for a decade or more. Life-extension programs and modifications of the W76-1, B-61-12, and W88 warheads are expected to be completed by 2024. A number of other programs won’t be completed until 2030. The report’s requests to replace Minuteman missiles, complete the W80-4 life extension program, and demonstrate the ability to build 80 or more plutonium pits a year all fall within that time period.
Trump will be president through 2024 at the most. Assuming Vladimir Putin wins reelection this year, he will also leave office in six years. The weapons expansion proposed in the 2018 NPR will continue past those presidents. If the two leaders want results during their tenure, they should consider resuming arms control talks. The result would be fewer nuclear weapons, thereby saving money, avoiding a new arms race, and making the world safer.
Cheryl Rofer worked as a chemist at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Now retired, she contributes to the online forums Nuclear Diner and Balloon Juice.
