Amended and modified by Paul Guinnessy.Unmodified version appeared as JASON Report on S&T for National Security Raises Concerns by Richard M. Jones at AIP's FYI.
'We begin by noting that a healthy DoD basic research program is essential. . . . However, despite the importance of DoD Basic Research, we believe that important aspects of the DoD basic research programs are ‘broken’ to an extent that neither throwing more money at these problems nor simple changes in procedures and definitions will fix them.' So concludes S&T for National Security, a report issued through the JASON Program Office, sponsored by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E).
The report was originally classified “for official use only," and it was only through a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the Federation of American Scientists that the report became public. After an initial partial denial that was then appealed, the report was released last month by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The views in the report reflect the assessment of independent academic researchers who consult for the US Department of Defense on matters of scientific interest.
This study was chartered by Zachary J. Lemnios, the director of Defense Research and Engineering, to consider how basic research should be structured within the DOD to best meet the challenges ahead.
The report’s authors consulted widely before making their conclusions available. They examined the impact of factors that influence defense basic research such as changes in the geopolitical scene, national security mission, and the rate of technology advance, as well as the globalization of technology, spread of commercial technology, and the changing technology talent pool.
The report looked at the rationale for defense basic research, which includes how some research fields are largely supported by DOD, the critical importance of practical engineering talent to the department’s missions, and the need for “basic researchers knowledgeable in DoD problems to scan and couple basic work to DoD applications.”
The report reviews changes in defense S&T funding, stating “the fractions devoted to applied and basic research have declined steadily. Both are currently at or near all-time lows, basic research is projected to increase during the next few years."
For example in 2005, Congress appropriated $1.5 billion for basic research, while in 2010 appropriation was $1.9 billion, an increase of $369 million or 24.4% over six fiscal years.
The Obama administration requested $2 billion for 2011.
The report explains that most basic research DOD funding is concentrated in the service branches, from which it flows primarily to universities. Industry receives a larger fraction of applied research and advanced technology development funding, which the report authors find “is an appropriate balance, in our view.”
The amount of basic research funding going to universities has been “roughly constant” while that to DOD laboratories has declined.
The report identifies two problems regarding 6.1 basic research funding: Its relatively small scale within the DOD budget results in a lack of high-level visibility and management attention, and difficulties in coordination since it is largely executed by the service branches.
The main problem in the 6.1 basic research program, as stated in the report, is as follows: “Over the years we have seen significant change in focus from long-term basic research to short-term deliverable-based research.” Additionally,
“DoD sometimes appears not to be adhering to its own definition of basic research in its use of 6.1 funds.”
“Basic research funding is not exploited to seed inventions and discoveries that can shape the future; investments tend to be technological expenditures at the margin.”
“The portfolio balance of DoD basic research is generally not critically reviewed by independent, technically knowledgeable individuals.”
“Common/uniform management and reporting of 6.1 with 6.2 and 6.3 funds is bad practice. It obscures the actual uses of 6.1 funds.”
The authors later observed that “people are the bedrock of a successful research effort, yet the present DoD research program is more about funding projects than supporting the best people.”
The authors were troubled by DOD lab structure, finding that it “has atrophied, for the most part” because it is largely devoted to the project management of the actual research performed by universities, industry, and federally funded research and development centers.
New technologies are seen as “high-risk” and largely avoided, the report stating “this often cuts the flow of ideas and demotivates the S&T workforce.”
In addition:
“DoD does not generally focus 6.1 funding on research of the highest caliber carried out by individuals with the potential to provide new paradigms for science and technology. DoD is getting what it asks for in tightly managed and focused research programs, but is reducing the potential for true breakthroughs.”
“DoD is not adequately participating in the development and maintenance of the S&T educational pipeline.”
“DoD is not effective in coordinating and overseeing the basic research program and funding across the department.”
“The bureaucracy associated with DoD research has grown to consume ever more time and has diverted program managers into administrative formalities at the expense of scientific program oversight.”
“The DOE Labs have a higher profile in basic research. This is especially true for LLNL [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory], LANL [Los Alamos National Laboratory], and SNL [Sandia National Laboratory], which are similar to the DoD labs in that they carry out basic research that leads to national security advances.”
The report concludes with a series of recommendations. These include focusing funding on people rather than projects, using 6.1 basic research funding for truly basic research, and eliminating large fluctuations in 6.1 annual funding.
Each service branch should establish a Research Corps, and DOD should strengthen and expand undergraduate and graduate programs. The report also calls for strengthening basic research within DOD, suggesting the creation of an Undersecretary for Science and Technology.
In a memo accompanying the report, Alan Shaffer, Principal Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering, states:
“Looking more broadly, this JASON report, along with a previous report from the National Academy of Sciences and an upcoming study by the Defense Science Board, are being used by the Department to monitor and address any uncovered weaknesses in its basic research programs. A wide range of direct interactions with Universities and laboratories is also being undertaken.”
