Feiveson, Glaser, Mian, and von Hippel reply: Our book, Unmaking the Bomb, is about the security risks of nuclear-weapon-usable (fissile) material—specifically, highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. We argue that the production, use, and stockpiling of those materials can and should be eliminated if we are to achieve a safer world. We engage with the issue of nuclear power only in that context.
Although, in principle, nuclear power could make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation, its future currently appears limited. The nuclear share of global electric power generation fell from a peak of about 18% in 1996 to 11% today. Looking forward to 2050, the International Atomic Energy Agency projects this share will keep falling or at most remain constant.1
Deploying nuclear power more intensively and widely would require that it be made safe against catastrophic accidents and resistant to possible diversion to nuclear weapons use. That would require public support, nuclear regulators who are protected from political pressure from the industry they regulate, and a much stronger and more equitable nonproliferation regime.
As the controversy over Iran’s nuclear energy program dramatizes, safeguards are not sufficient to deal with the risks of nuclear proliferation inherent in today’s nuclear energy technology. Even a very small nuclear power program can produce quickly significant quantities of nuclear weapons materials. Ending all plutonium separation and national control of uranium enrichment would be important steps to reduce these concerns.
In summary, phasing out carbon fuels is a priority, but so is preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament.
