Sig Hecker’s article, “Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy,” clearly demonstrates that international scientific interactions can enhance US national security. Unfortunately, particularly with regard to Russia, a lack of such interactions may increase the nuclear danger and perhaps even lead to Russia’s return to nuclear weapons testing.
As Hecker noted, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC-47 in 1996 for US scientists to engage their Russian counterparts in activities related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).1 That directive should have been a major boost to US–Russia cooperation in the unclassified scientific underpinnings of stockpile stewardship. However, as Hecker also noted and I reported in detail,2 lab-to-lab collaborations subsequently declined to a point where fewer CTBT-related cooperative scientific activities are in place now than were at the time the directive was released.
Past failure to adequately carry out PDD/NSC-47 may now stand as a roadblock to President Obama’s intention to “reset” relations with Russia.3 With the Obama administration poised to seek ratification of the CTBT, extensive scientific interactions called for by PDD/NSC-47 and advocated by Hecker may be the best assurance the US can have that Russia will comply with the CTBT. And perhaps more importantly, those interactions may be the best assurance to Russia, and other nations, that the US will comply. Renewing and rebuilding such collaboration and the trust that goes with it will require a determined effort truly championed by the Obama administration.
