How to couple different networks is a key issue in interdependent networks, where information sharing and payoff coupling are two frequently used methods. Unlike previous studies, in this paper, we propose a new coupling mode and test its performance in interdependent networks. Specifically, a player tends to seek additional support on another network only if his environment (defined as the proportion of holding different strategies in the neighborhood) is worse enough and exceeds an aspiration level. Conversely, it turns to the traditional version on single network if his environment is pleasing enough (the value of environment is small). Whether to establish additional support will directly influence the range of selecting fittest learning objects. As we can see from numerical results, moderate aspiration introduces diversity into the system and cooperation evolves with the support of network coupling. Besides, we also demonstrate that players with external links on the boundary of cooperative clusters protect internal cooperators and attract more players to cooperate under preferential selection rule.
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