In considering economic dynamics, it has been known that time delays are inherent in economic phenomena and could be crucial sources for oscillatory behavior. The main aim of this study is to shed light on what effects the delays can generate. To this end, different models of Cournot duopoly with different delays are built in a continuous time framework and their local and global dynamics are analytically and numerically examined. Three major findings are obtained. First, the stability switching conditions are analytically constructed. Second, it is numerically demonstrated that different lengths of the delays are sources for the birth of simple and complicated dynamics. Third, the delay for collecting information on the competitors’ output alone does not affect stability.
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September 2018
Research Article|
September 21 2018
Delay Cournot duopoly models revisited
Special Collection:
Nonlinear Economic Dynamics
Luca Guerrini
;
Luca Guerrini
a)
1
Department of Management, Polytechnic University of Marche
, 60121 Ancona, Italy
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Akio Matsumoto;
Akio Matsumoto
b)
2
Department of Economics, Chuo University
, 742-1, Higashi-Nakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0393, Japan
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Ferenc Szidarovszky
Ferenc Szidarovszky
c)
3
Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Pécs
, Ifjúságu 6, 7624 Pécs, Hungary
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Note: Paper submitted as part of the focus issue, “Nonlinear Economic Dynamics” (Published May, 2018).
Chaos 28, 093113 (2018)
Article history
Received:
December 28 2017
Accepted:
July 14 2018
Citation
Luca Guerrini, Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky; Delay Cournot duopoly models revisited. Chaos 1 September 2018; 28 (9): 093113. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5020903
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