In this paper, we propose an evolutionary oligopoly game of technology adoption in a market with isoelastic demand and two possible (linear) production technologies. While one technology is characterized by lower marginal costs, the magnitude of fixed costs entails that a technology does not necessarily dominate the other. Firms are forward-looking as they assess the profitability of employing either technology according to the corresponding expected profits. The dynamics of the system is studied through a piecewise-smooth map, for which we present a local stability analysis of equilibria and show the occurrence of smooth and border collision bifurcations. Global analysis of the model is also presented to show the coexistence of attractors and its economic significance. This investigation reveals that firms can fail to learn to adopt the more efficient technology.
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