The global conventional arms trade is worth tens of billions of dollars every year and is engaged in by every country in the world. Yet, it is often difficult to control the legal trade in conventional arms and there is a thriving illicit market, willing to arm unscrupulous regimes and nefarious non-state actors. This chapter examines the international conventional arms trade, the range of tools that have been used to control it, and challenges to these international regimes.
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