Due to the increasing importance of supply chain logistics service, we established the Stackelberg game model between single integrator and single subcontractors under decentralized and centralized circumstances, and found that logistics services integrators as a leader prefer centralized decision-making but logistics service subcontractors tend to the decentralized decision-making. Then, we further analyzed why subcontractor chose to deceive and rebuilt a principal-agent game model to monitor the logistics services quality of them. Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium and related parameters were discussed. The results show that strengthening the supervision and coordination can improve the quality level of logistics service supply chain.
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