The Relation between Micro‐ and Macro‐Worlds and the Problem of Observation

Recent investigations concerning foundations of quantum theory require new approaches to the problem of observation of physical events. V. Belavkin showed that standard quantum mechanics describes only the closed microworld in which there is no place for some macroscopically visible events. Though any quantum phenomenon is observable from the macroworld. That situation means non‐equivalence of Heisenberg’s representation to Schrodinger’s one in quantum mechanics. It would seem quantum theory is more general than classical mechanics. It is expressed, in particular, by well‐known Bohr’s principle of correspondence. I think the above‐mentioned Belavkin’s result puts under doubt the opinion concerning universal character of quantum theory. What ontological meaning has the concept of existence of physical event? Is distinction between observable event and non‐observable one anthropological, or not? In that context I discuss the new aspects of the observation problem in the physical theory. In my report I discuss philosophical arguments for the thesis that distinction between observable event and non‐observable one is ontological. In this connection I consider a number of objective ontological criteria of observability / non‐observability such as distinguishableness / indistinguishableness of physical states, symmetricalness and asymmetricalness of observation relations. The ontological sense of observation is analyzed in the context of relations between objects which are into spaces with different dimensions.