With the surge in the use of mobile crowd sensing as a reliable system for sharing data, information and services, the need for developing a more secure system that provides better privacy and robustness has increased drastically. Finding the right user pool who understands the task and its own capacity to do the task successfully is the first and an important step. It is also of the same importance to maintain the user pool and getting reliable data from them. Keeping the users motivated to pursue the task with their own resources at risk creates the challenge of having a reliable incentive mechanism that keeps the user motivated while working on the limited budget from the task generator. Not having an incentive proposal that attracts the users’ will to participate and to keep them motivated enough for the future tasks for which they have to compromise their privacy and device resources eventually leads to failure of the sensing activities. In this paper, we present a review of the recently proposed incentive mechanisms and compare the different work. Finally, we explore the future directions for research in the area of incentive techniques in mobile crowd sensing.
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