This paper considers sequential decisions in a quantity-setting mixed market with emission tax. We analyse two different situations: (i) The public firm as being the leader; and (ii) the private firm as being the leader. We compare the results obtained in these two combinations, By also comparing the results got in previous literature for the simultaneous decision case, we conclude that the equilibrium emission tax is the lowest when the public firm is the leader. Throughout the paper we present other results.

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